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Abstract 
 We analyze a model of wage payment practices in which strategic complementarities arise 
because each employer’s costs of delaying wages decrease with the arrears in its labor market.  The 
model is estimated on panel data for workers and firms in Russia, facilitating identification through 
fixed effects for employees, employers, and local labor markets, and instrumental variables based 
on policy interventions.  The estimated reaction function displays strongly positive neighborhood 
effects, and the estimated feedback loops – worker quits, effort, strikes, and legal penalties – imply 
that costs of wage delays are attenuated by neighborhood arrears.  We also study a nonlinear case 
with two stable equilibria: a punctual payment and a late payment equilibrium.  The estimates 
imply that the theoretical conditions for multiple equilibria under symmetric labor market 
competition are satisfied in our data. 
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“You shall not withhold the wages of poor and needy laborers, whether other Israelites or aliens 
who reside in your land in one of your towns.  You shall pay them their wages daily before sunset, 
because they are poor and their livelihood depends on them; otherwise they might cry to the Lord 
against you, and you would incur guilt.” 
Deuteronomy 24: 14-15 
1.  Introduction 
The wage contract is a fundamental economic institution whose essential elements are 
agreements concerning the nature of the work, the wage to be paid, and the schedule of payment.  
Economists typically assume that employers abide by their side of the contract, paying their 
employees reliably and on time, which appears to conform with normal practice in developed 
market economies.1  But the assumption is not always warranted, as evidenced by Moses’ ancient 
injunction to the Israelites, and it is clearly violated in post-Soviet Russia, where failures to pay 
wages on time have been substantial and persistent.  At the peak of wage arrears in late 1998, 62 
percent of Russian workers reported overdue wages averaging 4.8 monthly salaries per affected 
worker, with rates much higher in some areas and much lower in others.2 
Why do most employers regularly honor their wage contracts, but in some cases breach 
them on a large scale?  These extreme outcomes are difficult to explain by any single, continuously 
varying factor such as the effectiveness of legal enforcement.  The legal system is presumably part 
of the answer, but as Horace put it in 23 B.C., “Of what use are laws empty of customs?”3  In this 
paper, we argue that the practices of honoring or breaching wage contracts are characterized by 
increasing returns resulting from interactions within local labor markets.  Among firms, strategic 
complementarities arise because an employer’s costs of violating its contracts decrease in the 
extent to which competing employers violate their contracts.  Among workers, social interactions 
and outside opportunities affect responses to nonpayment, with the responsiveness decreasing in 
the pervasiveness of contract violations in the local area.  In particular, workers are less likely to 
quit, strike, or shirk in response to their own arrears if violations are common in their reference 
                                                 
1 In fact, there is no systematic data collection about breaches of the wage contract in most economies (perhaps because they are 
rare), although anecdotal evidence suggests they do occur.  The total number of wage and hour rule violations in the US during 
fiscal year 2003 (including some failures to pay wages on time) is reported by Department of Labor (2003), with 31,123 complaints 
involving 342,358 employees and $213mln in back pay. 
2 We discuss definitions and data sources in the next section.  Substantial wage arrears were characteristic of the Soviet economy in 
the 1930s (Gregory and Tikhonov, 2000), and they have also appeared in some other formerly socialist economies (Croatia, 
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine), but not elsewhere in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union. 
3 “Quid leges sine moribus vanae proficiunt” (Odes, 3.24). 
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group.  Furthermore, the legal system itself is endogenous because the effectiveness of contract 
enforcement within a jurisdiction is negatively related to the prevalence of violations as a result of 
congestion externalities and changing norms among workers and enforcement agents such as 
judges and prosecutors.  These quit, strike, effort, and legal responses are feedback mechanisms 
affecting the firm’s costs of alternative payment strategies. 
We present this argument in the form of a model of the managerial choice of overdue wages 
owed to an employee.  Under some conditions, the model generates multiple equilibria, and we 
study a symmetric game resulting in three:  a stable equilibrium in which wage contracts are 
honored so that overdue wages are negligible, an unstable one with an intermediate level of wage 
contract violation, and a stable one with high arrears.  The stable equilibria reflect institutional 
lock-in, tending to persist in the absence of massive shocks or coordination, and the unstable 
equilibrium represents a critical mass.  The model explains not only why arrears tend to persist 
once they have become pervasive, but also why they tend to disappear quickly when they are not 
widely established.  In this sense, the practice of honoring (or violating) contracts can be regarded 
as a social custom, a strategic complement, and an institution.4 
An interesting property of well-established customs is that they tend to be unquestioned, 
taken for granted.  Most employers do not treat delaying wage payments as a choice variable, and 
most employees do not wonder every payday whether they will receive their contractual wages.  
Despite their potential importance, these possibilities are usually not even considered.  Our premise 
in this paper is that much can be learned about such customs by analyzing a case where they break 
down massively, such as Russia in the 1990s.  The rise of overdue wages led to public outcry, with 
opinion polls ranking the issue as a top economic problem facing the country, but wage payments 
for many workers nevertheless remained unreliable for years.5  Besides the size and persistence of 
this contractual breakdown, our motivation for focusing on Russia is the fruitful testing ground it 
offers through the geographic variation within the country, the availability of linked employer-
                                                 
4 See Akerlof (1980) on social custom, Bulow et al. (1985) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) on strategic complementarity, and Aoki 
(2001) on an institution as a set of equilibrium strategies in a game.  Also closely related is the notion of convention, defined by 
Young (1993, p. 57) as “a pattern of behavior that is customary, expected, and self-enforcing.” 
5 See Javeline (2003).  Wage arrears have sometimes been ranked as the single biggest national problem, larger than low wages, 
despite the large decline and volatility of real wages through much of this period.  Yet wage arrears usually imply only occasional, 
not frequent, nonpayment (as we discuss in Section 2, below).  Russian workers evidently abhor the uncertainty about if and when 
they will be paid, and they value the reliability of regular wages as much as the actual wage level. 
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employee panel data, and the presence of policy interventions providing instrumental variables for 
estimation. 
Our empirical analysis of the Russian data begins by estimating a linear reaction function 
for wage contract violations, exploiting the unique features of our linked panel data that permit us 
to control both for correlated observables and for unobservable effects at the levels of the worker, 
the firm, and local labor market (defined narrowly as the district or rayon).  To identify the 
endogenous interactions within local labor markets, we employ instrumental variables based on 
policy interventions affecting a subset of employers, in the spirit of Moffitt’s (2001) and Bertrand 
et al.’s (2000) suggestions for identification of social interactions.  Second, we directly estimate the 
four feedback loops—quits, effort, strikes, and legal penalties—that we hypothesize contribute to 
the strategic complementarity.  Finally, we estimate a nonlinear form of the reaction function and, 
assuming symmetric competition in the local labor market and Nash behavior by managers, we 
calculate the three equilibria implied by the estimates. 
Our analysis is closely related to interactions-based models in which interactions typically 
promote convergent practices, and, depending on parameters, may generate multiple equilibria.6  
Empirical analyses of the phenomena face daunting identification problems, and they seldom 
estimate the possibility of multiple equilibria (Manski, 1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2001).  In our 
paper, the interactions occur on multiple levels:  the choices of firms whether to breach their 
contracts and the responses of workers and the legal regime to the breaches are all determined 
endogenously within local areas.  Our case offers unusual opportunities to identify the interaction 
effects econometrically, and we exploit the availability of detailed observable characteristics, fixed 
effects, and instrumental variables.  Unlike most studies of interactions-based models, which take a 
more reduced form approach, we are able to directly measure several feedback mechanisms that 
support strategic complementarities.  Furthermore, we extend the usual linear analysis to a 
nonlinear case to assess the possibility of multiple equilibria. 
                                                 
6 Among the many issues addressed in these models are social dynamics, technology choice, neighborhood effects, network 
externalities, strategic complementarities, and coordination problems.  Blume and Durlauf (2001) survey the large literature. 
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Interaction effects have received little attention in previous research on contract 
enforcement, frequently argued to be one of the institutional foundations of successful economies.7  
Yet the common references to “rule of law,” “business environment,” and “investment climate” all 
imply an overall culture in which individual actions are influenced by the choices made by others.  
Similarly, a major theme in literature on the transition from socialism is the importance of market-
supporting institutions, including those related to contract enforcement (Murrell, 1992; 
Dewatripont and Roland, 1996; Greif and Kandel, 1995).  But there has been little empirical 
analysis of these institutions, and no attention either to the role of interactions or to mechanisms 
that not only fail to support markets but serve to undermine them.8 
Previous studies of Russian wage delays have established some of the empirical regularities 
that motivate our analysis (e.g., Alfandari and Schaffer, 1996; Gimpelson, 1998; Lehmann et al., 
1999; Desai and Idson, 2000).  We depart from this research in our hypotheses, analytical 
approach, and use of linked employer-employee data (rather than just household or firm surveys) 
over a much longer time period.  Contrary to Layard and Richter (1995), we find it more useful to 
interpret wage arrears as a breach of contract rather than a flexible wage adjustment.  Our approach 
is partly motivated by Earle and Sabirianova’s (2002) findings of substantial variation across 
regions, variation both between and within firms, and high arrears even in well-performing firms 
(measured by profitability, productivity, hiring rate, output growth, employment growth, cash flow, 
or liquidity ratio), using data from 1994 to 1996.  These results are only descriptive, however, 
while in this paper we develop and estimate an explicit model.  Our model produces strategic 
complementarity and possible multiplicity of equilibria in wage delays, and we test its implications 
using new panel data from firm surveys we have organized and linked to employee information for 
a much longer period.9  Unlike previous descriptive studies, our approach seeks to establish 
causality and therefore requires attention to identification problems that we take into account in 
                                                 
7 See North (1990) and Hadfield (2004).  Historical case studies of contract enforcement institutions include Greif et al. (1994) and 
Milgrom et al. (1990).  The role of custom in the sharing rule in tenancy contracts is studied by Young and Burke (2001). 
8 More similar to our analysis are studies of multiple equilibria in the unofficial economy (e.g., Johnson et al., 1997) and in 
corruption (e.g., Bardhan, 1997). 
9 Our firm data cover 1991-1999 and our worker data cover 1994-2000.  After 2000, the firm identification information is no longer 
available in the worker data, nor is the location of observations in the narrow geographic units (districts) of our analysis.  
Subsequent household data show that much of the decline in aggregate arrears had occurred by our last observation; in late 2003, 26 
percent of workers still reported arrears, down from about 30 percent in late 2000.  Arrears have continued to attract public 
attention; see RFE-RL (2004), for instance. 
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estimating the reaction function.  We also estimate the hypothesized feedback loops and the 
equilibrium outcomes implied by the model.  Thus, our paper brings together and contributes to 
research on the Russian economy and the broader literatures on interactions, institutions, contract 
enforcement, and transition. 
The next section introduces our data.  Section 3 presents a simple model to motivate our 
analysis of firm interactions and feedback loops.  Section 4 describes our identification strategy 
and presents estimation results for the linear reaction function.  Section 5 contains estimates of 
feedback loops through worker turnover, effort, strikes, and legal remedies.  The possibility of a 
nonlinear reaction function is developed theoretically and estimated empirically in Section 6.  
Section 7 concludes with a brief summary and discussion of welfare implications. 
2.  Data 
2.1.  Data Sources 
Our model analyzes the determination of wage arrears in a particular employment 
relationship for a firm and a worker.  The data required to test the model include detailed 
information on both sides of the relationship, which we obtain from several sources.  The source of 
the worker data consists of the 1994-2000 waves of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(RLMS), a publicly available household panel based on the first national probability sample drawn 
in Russia.10  We have extended these data by using confidential information provided by most 
working respondents on their employers (frequently the name of the firm) to identify firms and the 
industries in which they operate.  This allows us to control for constant firm and industry 
heterogeneity and to construct reliable measures of job mobility and tenure. 
A second major data source is a detailed survey of agricultural and industrial employers that 
we carried out to collect information on wage arrears, quits, strikes, legal penalties, and other 
variables for the years 1991-1999.11  Our sampling frame was every identifiable employer of 
RLMS respondents, thus constituting a national probability sample of employers in industry and 
                                                 
10 The RLMS data we use are results of longitudinal surveys of about 10,000 individuals in late fall of 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, and 
2000.  Information on wage arrears is unavailable before 1994, and availability of links to firms and precise geographic location 
restrict our attention in this paper to 1994-2000. 
11 This data set “Inside the Transforming Firm” is available from the authors on request. 
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agriculture, with selection probability proportional to employment size.12  Unlike most surveys of 
firms, our procedure did not replace nonrespondents, and great efforts were expended to include 
every firm.  As a result of this procedure, the response rate is high:  64 percent among industrial 
firms (522 firms) and 73 percent among agricultural firms (75 firms).  Missing values reduce the 
sample to 560 (486 industrial and 74 agricultural firms).  We also add regional data from the 
Russian Labor Ministry Inspection Service on Labor Code violations and case outcomes, from 
which we construct regional measures of the effectiveness of legal enforcement. 
2.2.  Measuring Wage Contract Violations 
Our measure of wage contract violations is the stock of overdue wage debt owed by a 
particular employer to a particular employee.  Following the standard practice in Russia––among 
both workers and firms—we express these arrears in terms of the number of monthly wages the 
firm owes the worker.13  The RLMS asks this question directly, and the answers provide the 
measure of individual wage arrears (denoted ω) that we analyze. 
There are no good measures of arrears prior to 1994, but from anecdotal reports it is clear 
that they were negligible in the Russian economy before 1993.14  As shown in Table 1, however, 
the unconditional mean of ω already exceeded one monthly wage in 1994, and it rose in 1996 and 
again in 1998 before falling in 2000; the distribution of the variable shows pronounced rightward 
shifts in 1996 and 1998.  The mean level of ω is slightly lower in the public sector, which is 
defined on the basis of industries dependent on the state (federal, regional, and municipal) budgets 
in Russia:  defense industries, municipal utilities, health services, social work, education, culture 
and art, science, public administration, military, and public order and safety.  However, it is 
significantly higher in the defense sector, comprising defense manufacturing and the military, 
categories we distinguish because they are paid entirely from the federal budget and thus should be 
independent of local decision-making.   
                                                 
12 This statement is conditional on the RLMS sampling, which involves a two-stage geographic stratification procedure followed by 
random drawing of households (residences).   
13 Wages are paid monthly in Russia, and managers usually refer to the number of monthly wage bills when discussing arrears. 
14 Official data on wage arrears in Russia are incomplete and inconsistent in coverage, but they show generally similar patterns over 
time as the RLMS data.  See, for instance, Goskomstat (1999). 
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The proportion of workers with two or more months of arrears was already about 25 percent 
in 1994, and it had increased to nearly 44 percent by 1996 and 50 percent by late 1998.  
Conditional on having arrears, the expected magnitude rose from 3.3 months in 1996 to more than 
4.8 months in 1998.  While this debt represents a large fraction of a worker’s income, note that the 
increase of about 1.5 monthly wages over this 2-year period implies the loss of only about 0.75 
monthly wages each year, or about 6 percent of annual income.  Moreover, workers could hope to 
receive at least some of their back wages in the future, and indeed the conditional mean fell to 4.2 
monthly wages in 2000, and the fraction with arrears fell from 62 to 27 percent.   
In our empirical tests of the model’s hypotheses, we construct a measure of local arrears 
(Ω) from the RLMS by aggregating ω up to the district (rayon) level, each time omitting the 
particular firm for which the individual worker is employed.  While analyses of Russian regions are 
frequently conducted at the level of the oblast, we feel that the district much better reflects the 
scope of the local labor market.15  Table 1 illustrates the substantial variation across selected 
districts, some with trivial levels of arrears and others with up to 12 monthly wages per employee. 
2.3.  Sample Characteristics 
Table 2 summarizes worker and job characteristics of employees in the RLMS sample.  
36.7 percent are employed in the public sector and 5.3 percent in the defense sector.  Definitions of 
most individual attributes (such as gender, age, job tenure, years of schooling, employee 
ownership, occupation, and industry) are straightforward.  The hourly wage rate is computed as the 
ratio of the contractual wage to the usual hours of work in the previous month.16  Family income 
includes income (monetary and in-kind) received during the past month from all jobs, as well as 
retirement and unemployment benefits of other members of the household.  All income measures 
are calculated in constant December 2000 prices using the monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
                                                 
15 The Russian Federation has 89 oblasts and other constituent subjects, some of them larger than Texas.  The next lower 
administrative level is the rayon, of which there are 22 per oblast on average, thus roughly equivalent to a US county.  Our data 
contain 52 rayons, thus 52 different values of Ω in each year of the RLMS sample. 
16 Wage arrears produce high volatility in the measured wage.  In a given survey month, the reported wage is frequently zero (as 
high as 30 percent of responses by workers); it will be lower than the contractual wage when new wage debts are incurred and 
higher than the contractual wage when they are paid off.  To measure the contractual wage, we added questions to the RLMS in 
1998 and 2000, and for the earlier years we have followed Earle and Sabirianova (2002), imputing it as the ratio of the total wage 
debt to the number of monthly wages owed (ω). 
 8
Previous studies have found that wage arrears are more common among men, negatively 
associated with schooling, and positively related to age and job tenure; these may reflect skill 
specificities, mobility costs, and outside opportunities.17  Workers with arrears are more likely to 
be small shareholders and to have lower wages and family incomes.  Craft workers, operators, and 
assemblers tend to experience the highest rates, while managers have the lowest—although the rate 
is high even for this occupation.  Wage arrears are found in firms with a high level of financial and 
operating performance, as well as those performing poorly.  Finally, variation across industries is 
large, with higher incidence and magnitude in agriculture, defense and heavy industrial sectors, as 
well as in services financed through the state budget (education and health).  In a new and rapidly 
developing sector like banking and finance, however, arrears are very small. 
Summary statistics for the firm sample also appear in Table 2.  Compared with Table 1, 
mean ω and Ω are somewhat smaller in the firm data (although variation over time in these 
variables is quite similar across sources).  There are two reasons for the difference:  the time span 
begins earlier in the firm survey (as early as 1991 for some firms), and the firm survey excludes 
most of the public sector.  The latter consideration prevents us from using the firm data to follow 
the instrumental variables strategy in Section 4, and the firm survey data are used only in the 
estimation of feedback loops associated with costs of arrears. 
Table 2 also shows control variables in the firm sample:  union density, fringe benefits, 
training costs, industry, local type, and legal environment.  These variables, as well as the quit rate 
and incidence of strikes and legal penalties, are introduced in Section 5.1 below. 
3.  A Model of Wage Arrears 
This section presents a stylized model of managerial decisions about wage delays that 
focuses attention on interactions within local labor markets.  The model is also useful as a 
framework for considering several types of feedback loops that may support the use or nonuse of 
the late payment practice, for laying out critical assumptions in the analysis, and for suggesting 
important factors to control for in the empirical work.  Although arrears decisions have an 
important dynamic component, including the expectations of managers and workers concerning 
                                                 
17 See Lehmann et al. (1999), Desai and Idson (2000), and Earle and Sabirianova (2002). 
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each other’s behavior and the evolution of exogenous determinants, our static model captures the 
essential features of arrears we would like to describe.18 
The main result of the model is a general reaction (or best-response) function that relates an 
individual firm’s arrears behavior to the prevalence of arrears in the firm’s local labor market.  This 
reaction function is assumed to apply only to firms in the nonpublic sector of the economy, as 
public sector arrears are affected by government decisions – assumptions that we use in our 
identification strategy to empirically estimate the reaction function in Section 4. 
3.1.  Returns and Costs to Wage Arrears 
Consider a nonpublic firm whose manager chooses the level of back wages ω owed a 
particular employee in a particular time period to maximize π, which may represent either the 
firm’s profit or the manager’s private net benefits.  ω is essentially an involuntary loan from the 
worker to the firm, and we assume it earns the manager a gross per-period return of R(ω, X), with 
marginal return Rω(X) = r(X) assumed to be constant in ω but varying according to some 
characteristics of the firm, X (assumed to be scaled so that rx > 0).  The relevant characteristics may 
include the liquidity needs of the firm, the effective interest rate that it faces in borrowing from 
other sources, and the ability of the manager to appropriate the returns by diverting the funds to 
projects earning private benefits.  In Russia until August 1998, for example, poorly monitored 
managers could invest spare funds in short-term government treasury bills (GKOs), earning rates 
up to 150 percent.  In such situations, wage arrears are likely to be more attractive to managers who 
can relatively easily channel the extra cash flow to their own purposes. 
While it is not difficult to appreciate the potential returns that the firm might obtain from 
breaching its wage contracts, there are also costs of not fulfilling these obligations.  The potential 
costs include increased worker turnover, lowered effort, and higher probabilities of strikes and 
legal penalties.19  In each of these cases, we argue that the associated costs are positive functions of 
ω, but that the marginal cost is attenuated by the magnitude of arrears in the rest of the firm’s local 
                                                 
18 In addition, it is problematic to estimate a dynamic model because of the shortness and low frequency of the time series available. 
19 If π is private benefit rather than profit, these costs to the firm reduce the rents that the manager can take out of the firm, implying 
that they should matter to the manager as well.  
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labor market, Ω.  The rationale for each type of cost is fairly straightforward, and we provide 
evidence on the form of the costs in the empirical analysis below. 
A first type of cost arises because delaying wages may increase quits, if the worker 
responds by moving to another job or exiting the labor force altogether.  We assume that quits 
impose costs Q of replacement, associated with the need for hiring, screening, and training.  The 
quit decision is not modeled explicitly, but we assume the manager knows the probability of the 
worker quitting as a function of ω and Ω; and we hypothesize a negative impact of Ω on the 
worker’s quit response to arrears and thus on the firm’s marginal cost of arrears.  Higher Ω reduces 
the quit responsiveness because it reduces the attractiveness of mobility to other firms, and it may 
also increase the worker’s acceptance of the unreliability of wage payments.  Because workers 
differ in their mobility costs and outside opportunities, we permit the quit function to vary with a 
set of characteristics such as current compensation, firm-specificity of skills, mobility costs, and 
local labor market conditions included in the ZQ vector, so that Q = Q(ω, Ω, ZQ), with Qω > 0 and 
QωΩ < 0.20 
Wage delays may also affect productivity.  If morale declines and if effort is not perfectly 
observable, then workers may be more likely to shirk and, where they have some discretion over 
hours of work, to reduce their hours.  We summarize these agency issues as E for “effort costs” and 
assume that the manager expects that higher arrears may reduce productivity through mechanisms 
as in efficiency wage theory.  Such costs are likely to vary with worker characteristics, ZE, 
including the importance of morale for productivity, the difficulty of monitoring, and the degree of 
independence the worker has in decision-making.  We hypothesize that the negative effort effect is 
attenuated by wage arrears in the rest of the firm’s local labor market, Ω, as the worker’s decisions 
are influenced by outside alternatives (for instance, if caught shirking and fired) and by perceptions 
of the practice’s fairness or legitimacy (which are influenced by social interactions).  The effort 
costs may thus be written as E(ω, Ω, ZE), with the properties Eω > 0 and EωΩ < 0. 
                                                 
20 Firms wanting to reduce employment without layoffs may use wage arrears to induce quits, but we would again argue that 
workers’ responses will vary with Ω, and the relevant complementarity condition QωΩ < 0 remains the same.  Another possibility is 
that arrears reduce quits because quitters forgo their unpaid wages, in which case Qω < 0, but we would expect Qω to be still lower at 
higher Ω, so that again QωΩ < 0.  In practice, we estimate Qω > 0, as hypothesized in the model. 
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Another type of cost results if arrears increase strikes and other forms of protest behavior, 
resulting in costs summarized by S(ω, Ω, ZS).  Again, we assume a positive relationship that is 
attenuated by arrears in the local labor market, such that Sω > 0 and SωΩ < 0.  The argument is that 
workers view arrears in the context of what is “normal” in their environment (as in “pattern 
bargaining”), and they are less likely to protest their own arrears when their friends and neighbors 
are also being paid late.  The probability of such behavior is likely to be a function of other 
characteristics of the firm and worker, particularly the extent of unionization, included in a set of 
exogenous variables ZS. 
A final type of cost arises because wage arrears are violations of legal contracts, resulting in 
possible legal penalties and associated costs L(ω, Ω, ZL).21  Again, we hypothesize that the 
probability of legal costs is positively related to the level of arrears in the firm, but that the 
marginal effect is lower in jurisdictions with higher arrears, such that Lω > 0 and LωΩ < 0.  One 
motivation for this hypothesis is that the legal system in a jurisdiction may become congested with 
arrears cases, reducing the probability of punishment, similar to Sah’s (1991) analysis of the 
probability of punishment falling with the crime rate.  Furthermore, in a high arrears environment, 
breaches of the wage contract may be perceived as normal and legitimate, and law enforcement 
officials may therefore be less likely to press cases and assess severe penalties against infractions; 
workers may also be more pessimistic about the chances of resolving the problem through legal 
channels.  In the analysis of legal penalties and wage arrears, it is also important to take into 
account regional variation in the effectiveness of the legal system stemming from factors other than 
the congestion and lawsuit filing effects, ZL. 
To summarize, managers face four costs of wage arrears:  E, Q, S, and L, each of which is a 
function of ω, Ω, and some shift variables, the vector Z.  Although the costs are not directly 
observable, some proxies for the underlying behavior can be measured in our empirical work.  For 
convenience in the exposition of the rest of the model, we consider the sum of the four costs C(ω, 
Ω, Z) = E(ω, Ω, ZE) + Q(ω, Ω, ZQ) + S(ω, Ω, ZS) + L(ω, Ω, ZL), where Z = (ZE, ZQ, ZS, ZL) is a 
vector of other factors such as worker compensation and fringe benefits, skill specificity, search 
                                                 
21 The Russian Labor Code explicitly requires on-time payment of wages, and firms may be called to account by the civil courts 
(when workers file a lawsuit) or the Ministry of Labor’s Inspection Service.  The latter has been known to fine managers as well as 
firms, and, more rarely, to order managerial dismissal.  
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costs, difficulty of monitoring, strength of worker organization, functioning of the legal system, 
and characteristics of the local labor market.  The assumption that CωΩ < 0, marginal cost declining 
in local labor market arrears, is the crucial mixed partial derivative condition for strategic 
complementarities to emerge (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).  In our empirical analysis in 
Section 5 below, we test this assumption directly for each component of costs:  the negative effects 
of a worker’s arrears on her morale and work hours should decline in absolute value with the 
arrears level in the local labor market, and the positive effects of arrears on quits, strikes, and legal 
penalties should be attenuated by local labor market arrears. 
3.2.  The Reaction Function: ϖ = f (Ω, X, Z ) 
The manager chooses ω  to maximize the expected net return π: 
{ } ),,(),(max ZCXR Ω−= ωωπω , (1) 
where ω is the amount of back wages owed to the worker and Ω is the average amount of wage 
arrears in the local labor market outside the firm.  The corresponding first and second order 
conditions for the manager’s problem are ( ) ),,( ZCXr Ω= ϖω  and 0<− ωωC . 
The reaction function, the best response to other firms’ choices, can be derived as 
),,( ZXf Ω=ϖ . (2) 
Total differentiation of the first order condition yields 
.0=−Ω−− Ω dZCdCdCdXr ZX ωωωω ω  (3) 
Making use of the assumptions and the second order condition, we can derive the following 
comparative static results for the impact on ω 
.0 and 0 <−=>=
ωω
ω
ωω
ωω
C
C
dZ
d
C
r
dX
d ZX  (4) 
Thus, wage arrears should be positively related to the firm’s cost of capital and to the 
ability of managers to appropriate cash flow and earn private benefits.  They should be negatively 
related to the difficulty of monitoring the worker, to the value of the worker’s outside alternatives, 
to the strength of worker organization, and to the effectiveness of the legal system.  Finally, factors 
that reduce quit rate increase the probability of having wage arrears (specific human capital, 
employee ownership, high search and mobility costs, etc.). 
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Differentiating the reaction function (2) with respect to Ω (while holding constant the 
variables in X and Z) yields 
.0
)(
>−=Ω
−
Ω
ωω
ωω
C
C
d
d  (5) 
Thus, a direct implication of our model is that wage payment decisions exhibit positive 
neighborhood effects.  In the next section, we present our empirical estimates of a linear reaction 
function, followed by an empirical analysis of the feedback loops (in Section 5) and an example of 
a nonlinear reaction function implying the possibility of multiple equilibria (in Section 6). 
4.  Estimating the Linear Reaction Function 
 Our first tests of the model focus on the positive slope of the reaction function (∂ω/∂Ω > 0).  
We also examine the model implications that proxies for X raise ω and that proxies for Z lower ω, 
while postponing analysis of the feedback loops until the next section.  We first discuss our 
identification strategy and then present results. 
4.1.  Identification Strategy  
To test for positive feedback in the reaction function, we assume a linear functional form 
for Equation (2).  Estimating the function directly by ordinary least squares (OLS) may produce the 
standard “reflection” problems of any model of social interactions (Manski, 1993; Moffitt, 2001).  
As an illustration, consider the following model of endogenous interactions for two firms (for 
simplicity, each with one employee), indexed by i and k: 
( ) ijttijtijtjtiijt uDZX ++++Ω+= − τββββω 3210  
( ) kjttkjtkjtjtkkjt uDZX ++++Ω+= − τββββω 3210 , (6) 
where ωijt is the number of unpaid monthly wages of firm i in district j in period t; Ω(-i)jt is the level 
of wage arrears in the rest of the firm’s local labor market (district) j in period t; Xijt and Zijt are the 
vectors of observable factors affecting returns to and cost of using wage arrears, respectively; Dt is 
a set of year dummy variables; and the u’s are error terms. 
A first potential identification issue in estimating the wage arrears reaction function is the 
possibility that the reference group is endogenous.  Analogously to the choice of peer group in 
studies of teenage behavior (e.g., Evans et al., 1992), it is possible that firms and workers sort 
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themselves across districts with respect to their returns, costs, and tolerance of arrears.  The 
clustering of arrears within districts might merely reflect the tendency for similar agents to locate 
close to one another.  Our inclusion of district-level fixed effects controls for this possibility, but in 
any case such geographic sorting seems quite implausible, particularly in the Russian case.  An oft-
noted feature of Russian labor markets is the low geographic mobility of labor, explained by 
information problems, poorly functioning housing markets, and lack of liquidity (Mitchneck and 
Plane, 1995; Andrienko and Guriev, 2004).  All evidence implies that Russian regions are poorly 
integrated, and worker mobility across regions can act only slowly to affect regional differences. 
A second identification problem arises if omitted unobservables are correlated with Ω and 
also correlated across firms and workers within a local labor market.  Examples of such omitted 
variables that could produce Cov(uijt, ukjt) ≠ 0 in our model include differences across districts in 
resources, demand conditions, legal environment, or social norms such as tolerance towards 
contract violation.  The problem of correlated unobservables that are time-invariant may be 
handled with local labor market (district) fixed effects θj.  There could also be correlated time-
invariant unobservables at the levels of firms and of workers that we account for by including firm 
and worker fixed effects.  
The problem of correlated unobservables becomes more complex if they are not time-
invariant, so that for example there are common district-level shocks, or if error terms are 
correlated due to firm interdependence in the level of wage arrears:  ωijt ⇒Ω(-k)jt ⇒ωkjt ⇒Ω(-
i)jt⇒ωijt.  In the spirit of Moffitt (2001), our identification strategy is to search for exogenous 
interventions that alter wage arrears for some workers but not for others.  We exploit the fact that 
nonpayment of wages in the public sector is driven by a different process—governmental financing 
and revenue-sharing decisions—than wage delays in the nonpublic sector, which are driven by the 
considerations in our model.  Indeed, while data on the early period are scarce, we believe the 
initial burst of arrears in Russia was caused by the sequestration of budgetary funds by the Ministry 
of Finance in the early and mid-1990s.  Only very incomplete accounts of the extent of 
sequestration are available, but according to many observers the amounts were large.22  According 
                                                 
22 The motive for sequestration was to reduce the budget deficit and inflation following price liberalization in 1992; the deficit target 
figured strongly in IMF loan agreements at the time, and some policymakers even boasted of sequestration as a clever way to satisfy 
conditionality. 
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to the Institute for the Economy in Transition (1994, p. 35), for example, every expenditure line in 
the fourth quarter of the 1993 federal budget was sequestered by 20 percent.  Rather than shutting 
the government down, as sometimes happens during budgetary disputes in the US, the Russian 
government continued to operate, government contractors continued to supply, and state employees 
continued coming to work even when they began to be paid irregularly.  Unfortunately, detailed 
data on these early stages of wage arrears are unavailable. 
This discussion implies that an identification solution may be to use arrears practice in the 
public sector to identify neighborhood effects in the nonpublic sector.  Assuming two nonpublic 
firms, i and k, and one aggregated public sector firm, p, the model becomes 
( )
( )
,0),(),(
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εθτβββω
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 (7) 
where coefficients are permitted to vary between the nonpublic and public sector equations.  The 
identifying assumption is that Ω(-p)jt, the level of wage arrears in the rest of the aggregated public 
sector firm’s district j in period t, does not enter the equation for pjtω — in other words, that wage 
arrears in the public sector are determined by bureaucratic decisions in the federal and regional 
governments that are unrelated to arrears of nonpublic firms in the local area.23 
In these Equations (7), Ω(-i)jt equals the sum of average wage arrears in the public and 
nonpublic sectors, weighted by the share of workers in the corresponding sectors: 
( ) pjtpjt
p
pjt
ik
kjt
jt
jti nnN pjtnjt
ωωωω +−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=Ω ∑∑
≠
− 1
1
)( , (8) 
where pjtω  and njtω  are the average wage arrears in the public and nonpublic sectors respectively 
(again excluding firm i), and npjt is the share of workers in the public sector.  The first term in Ω(-i)jt 
is endogenous, while the second term is exogenous.  Therefore, we can employ pjtpjt Ω=ω  and pjtn  
                                                 
23 Note that this model assumes that the public sector forms part of the reference group for nonpublic firms (but not vice versa) 
because the response of nonpublic employees to arrears depends partly on their observations and opportunities in the public sector.  
As justification, we note that mobility between the two sectors is high: about half of job-to-job mobility from a public employer is to 
the nonpublic sector and a quarter of the mobility from a nonpublic employer is to the public sector.  Moreover, households are 
frequently composed of earners from both sectors:  among multi-earner households in our whole sample, 42.2 percent have only 
nonpublic sector employees, 15.0 percent have only public sector employees, and 42.8 percent are mixed.  
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as instruments, capturing both the magnitude of average arrears that appear exogenously and the 
relative share of this exogenous component in total regional arrears. 
 The identifying assumption of no interaction effects in the public sector is more likely to 
hold for the parts of the public sector that are funded exclusively by the federal government.  For 
this reason, we also examine the results using an alternative set of instrumental variables, the 
average local arrears in the defense sector and the share of workers in the defense sector in district j 
in year t.  These can be motivated by a similar decomposition of Equation (8) into the defense and 
nondefense parts of the public sector.24   
 The assumption of no feedback from the nonpublic to the public sector is also more likely 
to hold for the public sector outside of the local labor market at the national or aggregated regional 
levels.  As a further extension, therefore, we also employ a set of instruments inspired by Bertrand 
et al. (2000): the public sector arrears in Russia as a whole and in large federal regions together 
with interactions of these variables with the share of public sector workers in the local district, 
pjtn .
25  The argument is that even if pjtΩ were partly subject to feedback from nonpublic 
arrears njtΩ  in the same district, ptΩ at the national or federal region level would not be.   
4.2.  Results 
 Our discussion of identification issues implies the value of alternative estimation 
approaches.  We first provide OLS estimates of the reaction function, then in turn add district and 
firm fixed effects (FE), and both firm and worker FE.26  Finally, we employ various combinations 
of instrumental variables (IV).  Because both firms and workers are nested within districts, the firm 
and worker FE specifications also remove any fixed differences across districts.  In all cases, we 
compute robust standard errors adjusted for clustering within local areas or districts. 
The basic OLS and FE estimation results for the linear reaction function in the nonpublic 
sector are shown in Panel A of Table 3; Panel B adds a full set of interactions of year dummies 
with federal region indicators.  The estimated β (the coefficient on Ωjt) is positive and statistically 
                                                 
24 A disadvantage of the defense sector instruments is that 3 of 52 districts have no defense sector employees in the sample.  Small 
sample sizes more generally may make these instruments noisy, resulting in weak relationships with district arrears. 
25 Russia has 7 large federal regions formed on the basis of similar economic and climatic conditions among neighboring oblasts.  
We have about 7 local districts per federal region in our data. 
26 Estimated reaction functions with only worker FE yield similar results and are available upon request.   
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significant in all eight specifications.  In Panel A, the range of magnitudes is from about 0.4 (with 
district FE) to 0.8 (with firm FE).  In each case, the fixed effects are highly significant. In 
particular, the industry effects are highly significant (in the OLS and district FE specifications), and 
the district FE have an F-statistic of 1992.  These results imply that the data contain substantial 
unobserved heterogeneity in the cross-section, even when controlling for year effects (which are 
also statistically significant) and many other variables.  After controlling for district FE and for 
either firm FE alone or both firm and worker FE together, the estimated β remains sizable and 
statistically significant.  The Panel B specifications are still much more demanding in relying on 
deviations from the federal region-year mean to identify interaction effects, but the estimated 
effects remain positive and statistically significant.  These results provide some initial evidence of 
strong neighborhood effects in the violation of wage contracts. 
 The other variables in Table 3 represent Z variables, worker characteristics affecting the 
firm’s costs of delaying wages.  The results are quite similar across specifications as well as to 
results in previous research using earlier data:  wage arrears are higher for men, but they vary little 
with schooling, age, or family income.  The negative effect of tenure is consistent with the 
interpretation that longer tenured workers have relatively poor outside alternatives (Lehmann et al., 
1999).  The hourly wage has a negative coefficient, a relationship which Desai and Idson (2000) 
interpret as suggesting that managers delay wages to less productive workers.  A final result is the 
positive impact of small share ownership, which may imply that managers delay wages to acquire 
shares from their workers (Earle and Sabirianova, 2002). 
 Results for IV specifications of the reaction function for the nonpublic sector are presented 
in Table 4.  Aside from instrumenting Ωjt, the specifications are otherwise the same as in Table 3; 
the results for other variables are quite similar, so we omit them to save space.  We show results for 
5 alternative sets of the instruments.  Specification 1 includes npjt, the district share of employees 
working in the public sector, and Ωpjt, the average arrears among public sector employees in the 
district.  Specification 2 includes the district share of employees working in the defense sector and 
the average arrears among defense sector employees in the district.  Specification 3 uses the federal 
region public arrears (excluding the given local district) and their interaction with npjt as the 
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instruments.  In Specifications 4-5, national public sector arrears are interacted with the share of 
public sector workers in the district npjt and with a quadratic in npjt to take into account different 
functional relationships between national and local public sector arrears.  In the last three 
specifications, we do not treat npjt as an instrument, instead including it as a regressor to control for 
the possibility that public sector share is directly correlated with local economic shocks.  The 
columns on the left side of the table include district FE, while those on the right include firm FE; 
results with worker FE and with both firm and worker FE are qualitatively similar.   
In each specification in Table 4, the estimated coefficient on Ωjt is positive, large, and 
statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level, lying in a range from 0.61 to 0.96.  The local 
public employment share npjt typically has a large positive coefficient, although it is not always 
precisely estimated.  In each case, the first-stage results show that the excluded instruments are not 
weak and significantly increase Ωjt.27  The value of the Hansen J statistics suggest that the data 
marginally reject exogeneity of npjt and Ωpjt, which might imply some reverse feedback from the 
nonpublic to the public sector, but the data fail to reject exogeneity of defense sector instruments 
with firm FE (Specification 2), as well as in every case with multiple instruments based on higher 
levels of geographic aggregation (Specifications 3 and 5).28  These results again imply strongly 
positive local interactions in the nonpublic sector, as our model predicts. 
5.  Estimating the Feedback Loops 
 This section presents empirical estimates of feedback loops that create strategic 
complementarities across firms in their wage arrears decisions, constituting indirect tests of the 
complementarity hypothesis.  We draw upon both the worker and the firm data to construct proxy 
variables for the four types of costs of arrears discussed in the model, and summary statistics for 
these variables are displayed in Table 2.  The variables “actual hours of work,” “desire to switch 
jobs,” and “job separations” are measured from the RLMS, while “quit rate,” “strikes and other 
                                                 
27 The first stage results in specification (3)-(5) show that local arrears are strongly correlated with npjt and federal region public 
sector arrears (the national arrears drop out of specifications (4)-(5) because they are collinear with the year effects).  The sign of the 
interaction term is negative, implying that higher-npjt districts tend to be allocated less of the national and regional arrears than 
lower-npjt districts, which could result if npjt is correlated with political influence or scale economies.   28 We have also estimated Table 3 specifications for the public and defense sectors as function of Ωjt.  The results (which are 
upward-biased due to the absence of an instrument to purge common unobserved shocks) show much weaker although statistically 
significant interactions in the public sector, but they show no significant feedback to arrears in the defense sector; the coefficient 
estimates with district FE are 0.298 in the former case and 0.098 in the latter. 
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forms of protest,” and “legal penalties” are drawn from the enterprise survey.  We argue that the 
first two variables—actual hours of work and desire to switch jobs—proxy for morale and job 
satisfaction which are likely to influence work effort.  
We analyze two measures of worker turnover.  The first, based on the RLMS panel, defines 
a job separation as no longer working for the employer two years later.  This includes all types of 
separations, but available evidence strongly indicates that the share of involuntary separations is 
very low in Russia—generally less than 10 percent (e.g., Brown and Earle, 2003).  The second 
measure, derived from the firm survey data, includes voluntary separations only, is expressed as a 
ratio to average firm employment, and refers to a one-year period.   
The final two potential costs of arrears are also measured at the firm level.  “Strikes” refer 
not only to formal work stoppages but also to other forms of protests, such as hunger strikes and 
work slowdowns.  The data imply they are much more common in firms reporting wage arrears 
than in those not, and wage arrears were by far the most commonly cited reason for strikes by firms 
reporting them in response to a direct question.  “Legal penalties” refer specifically to fines for 
wage arrears, which are imposed by either a civil court or the Labor Inspection Service.  As Table 
2 shows, the incidence of both variables is very low in the early 1990s but becomes more 
substantial in the second half of the decade. 
Recall from Section 3.1 the model assumptions of Cω > 0 and CωΩ < 0:  the costs of not 
paying wages exhibit positive feedback in the sense that the costs of arrears are reduced on the 
margin when other firms in the local labor market tend to have higher arrears.  Each type of cost 
represents a feedback loop contributing to self-propagation of the wage arrear practice. 
 The critical assumption of a negative cross-partial derivative may be directly tested using 
an interaction term in each equation.  The relationship between the costs of using wage arrears and 
the wage arrears environment can be presented in linear form as follows: 
( ) ijtjtDijtZjtiijtjtiijtijtC εθτγωωββωωβ ++++−ΩΩ+−ΩΩ+= )( , (9) 
where Cijt are proxy measures for wage arrears costs such as hours of work, desire to switch jobs, 
quits, strikes, and legal penalties. 
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Table 5 shows estimates from the worker survey data for the functions with desire to 
change jobs, hours of work, and job separation as dependent variables.  The impact of ω on a 
worker’s hours and desire to switch jobs is reduced by Ω (so that EωΩ < 0).  Computing 
∂(Hours)/∂ω at alternative levels of Ω, we find that workers in low-Ω regions reduce their hours in 
response to their own arrears, so that if Ω = 0, hours fall 1.87 hours per month for each one month 
increase in ω.  But ∂(Hours)/∂ω falls as Ω rises, and at Ω = 8.9 months, the effect vanishes entirely.  
Similarly, the probability that an individual reports a desire to switch jobs increases by 2.2 percent 
for each month of ω in regions where Ω = 0.  Given an overall average probability of 38 percent, 
this effect implies that an individual who has eight months’ arrears and lives in a low arrears region 
would be 50 percent more likely to desire a job change compared to an otherwise identical 
neighbor with no wage arrears.  But the effect declines with Ω such that the point estimates suggest 
it becomes negligible at about Ω = 11. 
 Table 5 also shows the estimated job separation function using individual data.  Again, the 
results imply Qω > 0 and QωΩ < 0 for this component of costs.  When Ω = 0, the separation 
probability is estimated to increase by nearly 1 percentage point for each one-month rise in ω, and 
as Ω rises the estimated response to ω declines, becoming negative after Ω = 8.  These estimates 
are again consistent with our hypothesis that wage arrears are strategic complements for managers 
of firms operating in the same local labor market. 
Table 5 results concerning the vector of Z controls in the regressions are fairly standard:  the 
hours equation implies that both the hourly wage rate and nonlabor (family) income have a 
negative estimated effects, while male gender, schooling, and age are all positively associated with 
hours.  The regression for desire to switch jobs shows that the probability declines with the 
contractual wage and with job tenure.  In the quit function, results for the Z controls show that male 
gender is positively associated while schooling and tenure are negatively associated with the quit 
probability. 
Turning to the feedback functions using the firm survey data, we specify the Z vector to 
include dummies for industry, year, and type of location (four city-type categories) in all equations.  
The quit rate and strike probability functions also include union density (percentage of employees 
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who are union members), provision of fringe benefits (training, kindergartens, and housing), and 
training costs for new employees (measured as number of days required in initial training).  The 
legal penalties equation includes proxies for the legal environment in the subject of the Russian 
Federation drawn from the Ministry of Labor’s Inspection Service in 1997.  One variable is the 
ratio of uncollected fines to the total number of fines assessed on managers because of labor 
violations, which we interpret as reflecting (inversely) the strength of the legal system in carrying 
out at least those punishments it does assess:  managers would have relatively little to fear in 
regions where this ratio is high.  A second measure is the fraction of cases where wage arrears were 
paid off after they were found by (or reported to) the Inspection Service.  Summary statistics for all 
these controls are reported in Table 2. 
For all three dependent variables, the results in Table 6 show that Ω tends to lessen the 
impact of ω on the costs to the firm of using arrears:  QωΩ < 0, SωΩ < 0, and LωΩ < 0.  The 
magnitudes imply that when Ω = 0 the quit rate rises by about 1 percentage point for each one-
month rise in ω and the strike probability by about one-third of a point, so that if ω = 8 the quit rate 
rises by 50 percent and the strike rate more than doubles relative to the situation with no wage 
arrears.  The estimated effect on the probability of legal penalties is also positive when Ω = 0, but 
again it declines as Ω  increases.  These costs of wage arrears are virtually vanishing in the 
observed range of behavior.   
Concerning the results for other variables, union density, training provision, and the level of 
training costs are estimated to reduce the quit rate.  The effect of union density on the strike 
probability is statistically insignificant, a result consistent with the assessment that Russian unions 
are weak (e.g., Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 2001).  The fraction of cases where managers failed to pay 
assessed fines on time is estimated to have a negative impact on the probability of legal penalties, 
which we interpret as a reflection of the effectiveness of local legal institutions.  The negative 
impact of the fraction of cases in which arrears were paid off may reflect the lower likelihood of 
penalties if the manager quickly pays wages after the Inspection Service brings a case.  In any 
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event, the results for all four components of costs strongly support the hypothesis of positive 
feedback loops, suggesting increasing returns to the use of wage arrears.29 
6.  Estimating a Nonlinear Model of Wage Arrears Interactions 
 Returning to the model in Section 3, we obtain the reaction function’s second derivative: 
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which may be positive as well as negative.  Multiple equilibria require sign switching.  Such a case, 
where the second derivative is initially positive and then turns negative after Ω exceeds the 
inflection point Ωι, is shown in Figure 1.  To motivate this case more fully, we next consider a 
particular functional form for the cost function, one from which we derive an estimable reaction 
function that permits the possibility of multiple equilibria. 
6.1.  A Particular Functional Form for Estimation 
Consider the following special form of the cost function: 
( )eZdcbaC ++−−⋅= 32 ΩΩΩωω , (11) 
which may generate multiple Nash equilibria, as we show below.  We will again assume that the 
cost function satisfies the following conditions: 
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Parameters a and e are positive by virtue of our earlier assumptions, but we also hypothesize that c 
and d are positive, while the sign of b is ambiguous, for reasons that we discuss shortly.  The first-
order condition of maximizing the objective function implies the equality of marginal return and 
marginal cost associated with wage arrears: 
( )eZdcbar ++−−−= 32  max ΩΩΩωωωπω  (13) 
eZdcbar ++−−= 322 ΩΩΩω .  
From the first order condition we can derive an estimable reaction function:  
                                                 
29 The longer working paper version of this article contains discussion and empirical analysis of the possibility that wages and wage 
arrears are jointly determined.  We find no statistically significant relationship and all point estimates on wage arrears in a hedonic 
wage function are negative, inconsistent with a tradeoff between the two variables. 
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( ) ,2/32 aeZrdcb −+Ω−Ω+Ω=ϖ  (14) 
where ϖ is a cubic function of Ω. 
 The reaction function exhibits positive feedback: 
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 But the sign of the second derivative is ambiguous: 
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depending on c, d, and Ω .  For fixed c and d > 0, the reaction function exhibits a cubic S-shape 
with inflection point at Ωi = c/3d.  At lower levels of local labor market arrears (Ω<c/3d) the 
response function is convex, and at higher levels it is concave.  We test these implications below. 
6.2.  Equilibrium Wage Arrears 
In symmetric Nash equilibrium, where all firms in a local labor market face identical return 
and cost functions and where they take each other’s actions as given, the level of firm wage arrears 
must be equal to the level of regional wage arrears (ω*=Ω*), which implies 
.0)2( *2*3* =−+−++− eZrabcd ωωω  (17) 
It is possible to solve this equation analytically for three equilibria in terms of a, b, c, d, e, r, 
and Z, but the equations describing the solutions are very long (several pages each).  To simplify 
for illustrative purposes, we note that r–eZ > 0 implies that even if no other firms in the region have 
wage arrears (Ω=0), the net return to wage arrears is still positive, implying ω > 0.  Since most 
economies are characterized by regular payment of wage obligations, we normalize the results, 
assuming r=eZ, which implies simple analytical solutions for wage arrears equilibria: 
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The first equilibrium involves zero firm wage arrears at zero regional wage arrears, while positivity 
of the second requires 4d(b-2a)<0, implying restrictions on a and b such that b/2a<1.  b may be 
positive or negative, although our hypotheses imply a generally positive slope. 
We may label ω1* the “contracts honored” or “punctual payment equilibrium,” ω2* the 
“critical mass” or “threshold equilibrium,” and ω3* the “contracts breached” or “wage arrears 
equilibrium.”  ω1* and ω3* are stable and ω2* is unstable, as we show in our working paper (Earle 
and Sabirianova Peter, 2006).  Figure 2 displays the symmetric Nash equilibria and the dynamics 
implied by the model.  In the range where ω1* < Ω  < ω2*, a self-interested manager will choose ω 
< Ω, so optimizing behavior by all managers will tend to drive down Ω.  Beyond ω2*, managerial 
behavior will tend to push up Ω until it reaches ω3*, the stable late payment equilibrium. 
6.3.  Nonlinear Estimation Results  
Multiple equilibria may arise when the reaction function has an S-shape, so that at low 
levels of Ω, ∂2ω/∂Ω2 > 0, while at higher levels ∂2ω/∂Ω2 < 0.  The functional form of the 
manager’s objective that we have employed as an example (Equation (13) above) suggests a cubic 
form for the reaction function, with alternating signs on the coefficients in the polynomial on Ω.  
More specifically, we can test that the critical parameters c and d are both positive, while b/2a<1. 
We therefore estimate the reaction function (14).  Decomposing the Z vector into 
observable and unobservable components leads directly to our estimating equation: 
ωi = β0 + β1Ωi + β2Ωi2 + β3Ωi3 + β4Xi + β5Zi’ + ξi, (19) 
where we use the subscript i to index individual workers, and where β1 = b/2a, β2 = c/2a, β3 = -
d/2a, β4 = r′(Xi)/2a, and β5 = -e/2a.  We have decomposed the vector of Z controls to include a 
constant, β0, a vector of observable characteristics, Zi’, and a residual reflecting an unobserved 
component in the cost function, εi; thus, Zi = β0 + Zi’ + εi, and ξi = εi/2a. 
Because our analysis of the linear interactions model found similar results when we used 
instrumental variables based on public sector arrears, defense sector arrears, and national and 
federal region aggregations, we report estimates of Equation (19) without instrumenting, but to 
examine robustness we include both OLS and FE estimates in Table 7.  In fact, as in the linear 
case, the inclusion of unobservable time-invariant effects at the district, firm, and worker level does 
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little to alter the results, nor are the results much altered by the inclusion of a full set of interactions 
between federal regions and years.  The results for X and Z variables are very similar to those in 
Table 3 and therefore are not displayed in Table 7. 
Concerning the polynomial in Ω, one of the less obvious predictions of the theoretical 
model, emerging from the discussion above, is that b/2a = β1 < 1.  This implication is satisfied by 
all the estimates in Table 7, and in all cases we can reject the hypothesis that β1 = 1 at the 1 percent 
level.  This is also a necessary condition for stability of the extreme equilibria.  The signs of the 
estimates of c and d are also consistent with the theoretical model in all four estimated models, and 
they are statistically significantly different from zero. 
The nonlinear estimation results continue to support the hypothesis of positive 
neighborhood effects over most of the relevant range.  Only when district fixed effects are included 
is β1 statistically significantly less than zero, and even in this case, the reaction function is 
estimated to have a positive slope for Ω > 3.2.  In all cases, the point estimates of the coefficients 
imply an S-shaped reaction function. 
6.4.  Simulating Symmetric Nash Equilibria 
Whether an S-shaped reaction function produces multiple equilibria depends on the 
magnitudes of the parameters.  Using the estimated parameters of the empirical reaction function, 
we may simulate symmetric Nash equilibria and calculate the levels of arrears consistent with the 
two stable equilibria and with the unstable critical mass threshold. 
Figure 3 graphs the estimated reaction function, taking the average of β0 + β4Xi’ +  β5Zi’ 
across all individuals in the sample, which then becomes the intercept for the plotted relationship.  
Under the assumption of symmetric Nash behavior in local labor markets, it is straightforward in 
principle to solve the estimated reaction functions for the set of average equilibria across regions.  
Figure 3 does this in the simplest way, by finding the intersection between the reaction function 
and a 45° ray from the origin. 
As is evident from the figure, the results suggest there are indeed multiple equilibria.  The 
average punctual payment equilibrium in Russian regions involves less than one monthly wage 
debt, the critical mass equilibrium is 5.5 months, and the late payment equilibrium is 9.5 months.  
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The estimates imply stability of the extreme equilibria ω1* and ω3* and instability of the threshold 
ω2*.  Thus, the data provide support for some of the model’s crucial details as well as the most 
important predictions of positive feedback and multiple equilibria. 
6.5.  Equilibrium Selection and Robustness 
If there are multiple equilibria in wage arrears, how do countries or regions get into the 
punctual payment or the late payment equilibrium?  A natural candidate for selecting the 
equilibrium would be a large employer, one able to move the equilibrium from one side of the 
critical mass threshold to the other by setting a standard that other employers follow.  In the 
Russian case, we argue that role was played by the state, which, as we have discussed, initiated late 
payments on a large scale by budgetary sequestration to reduce the fiscal deficit.  It is notable that 
the share of employment accounted for by the public sector was actually growing through most of 
this standard-setting period.30 
How robust is the late payment equilibrium?  For instance, while our analysis has focused 
on symmetric Nash equilibria, what prevents some firm, say a new entrant, from violating the late-
payment norm by offering workers a lower wage, but one paid regularly on time?  Our model 
shows that identical firms will not defect from the late payment equilibrium, but in practice there is 
likely to be heterogeneity, particularly in the case of new start-ups.  Firms with profitable 
opportunities seeking to hire new employees may try to build a reputation for punctual payment if 
workers care about this characteristic of their jobs. 
While such a process may sometimes occur in a number of regions of Russia, in order to 
explain why it does not unravel the late payment equilibrium in regions with persistently high 
arrears, we must call upon other aspects of the Russian environment:  the severe recession, the 
limited role of entry, and the continual instability and illiquidity.  The large fall in output and 
consumption has reduced the profitability of entry, and the continual instability has made it 
difficult for firms to establish reputations.  We can imagine a signaling game in which there are 
two types of firms:  in one type, where prospects are poor, managers simply try to steal wages; in 
                                                 
30 According to OECD (1997), employment in public administration grew steadily from 663,000 in 1990 to 1,087,000 in 1995, or 
from 0.88 to 1.64 percent of total employment.  
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the other, which has profitable projects, managers try to pay workers and build a reliable reputation 
in order to increase effort and reduce turnover.  But the type of firm is unobservable to workers, 
and all managers can announce (as they have done) their most sincere intentions to pay wages “as 
soon as the firm has money.”  In this situation, the ability of the second type of managers to 
distinguish themselves from the first type amounts to the possibility for existence of a separating 
equilibrium.  If economic instability is so great that occasional shocks hit every firm with some 
probability, rendering them temporarily unable to pay, then firms cannot build a reputation and 
workers may not be able to distinguish the firm types in practice.  This analysis is outside our 
formal model, and it is difficult to verify empirically, but it does explain why a late payment 
equilibrium may be robust even when new entry and firm heterogeneity are permitted. 
7.  Conclusion 
This paper has developed and tested several key features of a model of local labor market 
interactions in employer decisions to violate wage contracts.  Our model provides a framework for 
understanding how such interactions may arise through the relationship between the costs to 
employers of using arrears and the extent of arrears in the local labor market environment.  It also 
provides some guidance for empirical estimation of the reaction function and of the feedback loops 
that may support a timely or late wage payment practice.  Under certain circumstances, the model 
also suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria. 
Our empirical analysis provides strong evidence of positive feedback in the manager’s 
choice of wage arrears from the behavior of other firms operating in the same local labor market.  
Rational managers do indeed appear to take into account the wage arrears behavior of neighboring 
employers when choosing their own strategies.  This result for the nonpublic sector of the Russian 
economy is robust to the inclusion of fixed effects at the level of the worker, the firm, and the local 
labor market, and to the use of instrumental variables associated with the exogenous determination 
of arrears in the public sector.   
Furthermore, the data provide strong support for the existence of several feedback loops.  
We find that higher wage arrears in the local labor market attenuate the positive impact of arrears 
on the worker’s quit probability and the firm’s quit rate.  Higher local arrears also reduce the 
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negative impact of a worker’s arrears on measures of effort and work hours.  They reduce the 
positive impact of arrears on the strike probability, and they reduce the impact of the level of a 
firm’s arrears on the probability that a legal penalty will be assessed. 
The final empirical results concern the nonlinear reaction function and the possibility of 
multiple equilibria in wage arrears.  Our estimates of a cubic reaction function, derived from a 
particular functional form for the costs of arrears, imply a clear S-shape.  The magnitudes of the 
parameters imply that the average Russian region may indeed face multiple equilibria.  The 
estimates imply a threshold equilibrium of about 5.5 monthly wages and a late payment 
equilibrium of 9.5.  We hasten to add that these results are merely illustrative of the method that 
can be used for addressing this issue, but we believe they are highly suggestive of the existence of 
multiple equilibria in the practice of wage contract violations. 
If the practice of contract violation exhibits multiple equilibria, what are the welfare 
characteristics of the contract violation versus the punctual payment equilibrium?  Notwithstanding 
injunctions against wage delays reaching back to Moses, some observers praise wage arrears as a 
way of achieving wage flexibility and low unemployment in Russia (Layard and Richter, 1995; 
OECD, 1997).  We would argue on the contrary that wage arrears are far from a socially efficient 
mechanism for bringing about a given real wage cut:  the reduction in utility is greater because of 
the uncertainty concerning the timing and probability of eventual payment. 
It seems to us, however, that the major consideration in a normative evaluation of arrears 
stems from the importance of wage contracts to most individuals.  The violation of those contracts 
reduces confidence in other labor and nonlabor contracts into which the individual might enter, and 
thus may undermine the development of contract enforcement and rule of law.  North (1990) and 
others have argued these are critical institutions in promoting impersonal exchange, potentially 
accounting for much of the variation across countries in economic growth and performance.  Our 
analysis provides a case study of the lock-in of an institutional practice that is inimical to these 
institutions and thus to the development of a healthy market economy. 
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Table 1:  Magnitude of Wage Arrears, Worker Data 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 
Mean(ωit)       
All sectors 1.10 1.11 1.92 3.00 1.14 
Public sector 0.82 0.88 1.80 2.93 0.97 
Defense sector 1.42 1.15 2.75 4.21 1.35 
      
Mean(ωit⏐ωit  > 0)  2.75 2.73 3.27 4.82 4.24 
      
Unconditional distribution (ωit)      
ωit    = 0 month 0.603 0.593 0.415 0.379 0.731 
= 1 month 0.149 0.156 0.149 0.122 0.111 
= 2-3 months 0.164 0.170 0.250 0.219 0.085 
= 4-6 months 0.055 0.055 0.134 0.163 0.032 
= 7-9 months 0.014 0.007 0.025 0.046 0.007 
> 9 months 0.016 0.019 0.028 0.072 0.034 
      
Ωjt in selected districts       
“A” 0.417 0.478 1.167 1.080 0.407 
“B” 0.627 0.480 0.593 1.256 0.137 
“C” 2.236 2.274 3.574 4.301 1.408 
“D” 4.119 6.581 6.175 11.690 9.898 
      
Observations 4667 4310 4050 3781 4000 
 
Notes:  ωit = number of monthly wages reported overdue by an employee-respondent i in year t; Ωjt = average number 
of monthly wages owed in the rest of the firm’s local labor market.  Sample consists of all employee-respondents in the 
RLMS.  Districts are indicated as “A” through “D” because the RLMS data confidentiality agreement precludes the 
release of district names. 
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Table 2:  Characteristics of the Worker and Firm Samples 
 
Worker Sample Mean Firm Sample Mean 
Public sector 0.360 ωit (number of monthly  1.175 
Defense sector 0.053   wages overdue) (2.375) 
Ωjt (local arrears) 1.606 Ωjt (local arrears) 1.146 
 (1.460)  (1.321) 
Male 0.478 Strikes (dummy) 0.019 
Schooling (years) 11.823 Quit rate (quits/employment) 0.169 
 (2.542)  (0.169) 
Age (years) 39.135 Legal penalties (dummy) 0.010 
 (11.817) Union density (% members)  
Tenure (years) 8.345 0-9% 0.086 
 (9.141) 10-59% 0.095 
Employee owns  60-79% 0.088 
No shares 0.812 80-89% 0.087 
<1% 0.104 90-99% 0.275 
≥1% 0.036 100% 0.369 
No information 0.048 Firm fringe benefits   
Hourly wage rate (rubles) 14.058 Training 0.647 
 (21.016) Kindergartens 0.433 
Family income (thous. rubles) 0.966 Housing 0.382 
 (1.788) Training costs (days) /100 82.022 
Industry   (92.850) 
Mining 0.023 Industry  
Machine building 0.109 Energy & fuel 0.088 
Light and food 0.050 Metallurgy & chemicals 0.081 
Other manufacturing 0.101 Machine building 0.318 
Agriculture/forestry 0.103 Wood and building materials 0.105 
Transportation 0.078 Light 0.089 
Construction 0.071 Food 0.135 
Private services 0.140 Other 0.060 
Public services 0.326 Agriculture 0.123 
Monthly hours of work 147.940 Type of location  
 (73.898) Moscow and St. Petersburg 0.105 
Desire to switch jobs 0.379 Regional capital city 0.360 
Quit in two years 0.291 Other city 0.342 
Occupation  Non-city 0.194 
Managers and professionals 0.193 Legal Environment in region  
Technicians 0.176 Fraction of cases when managers  0.098 
Clerks and service workers 0.166   fail to pay assessed fines on time (0.085) 
Craft workers 0.176 Fraction of cases where arrears were  0.216 
Operators and assemblers 0.181   paid off after violation was  (0.158) 
Unskilled workers and army 0.108   discovered  
 
Notes:  Observations in the worker sample=20106, except for non-zero hourly wage rate (17285), hours (19248), desire to 
switch jobs (19548), and quits (9441).  The worker sample consists of all employee-respondents with nonmissing values 
on wage arrears, schooling, age, tenure, occupation, and industry.  Observations in the firm sample=4061, except for quit 
rate (2611) and legal penalties (3675).  Sample consists of industrial and agricultural firms with nonmissing values on 
wage arrears, union density, and fringe benefits in 1991–1999.  Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.  The quit 
rate is ratio of number quitting to average employment. 
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Table 3:  Linear Reaction Function, Nonpublic Sector 
 
 OLS District FE Firm FE Firm-Worker FE 
Panel A  
Ωjt (local arrears)  0.715*** 0.385*** 0.747*** 0.819*** 
 (0.052) (0.097) (0.086) (0.130) 
Male 0.400*** 0.398*** 0.349*** … 
 (0.101) (0.097) (0.117)  
Schooling (years) 0.013 0.008 -0.014 -0.025 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.027) (0.030) 
Age (years) 0.002 0.001 0.010* … 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)  
Tenure (years) 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.025** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) 
Log of hourly wage rate  -0.375*** -0.461*** -0.384*** -0.349*** 
 (0.045) (0.053) (0.068) (0.086) 
Log of family income  -0.030 -0.076** -0.062 -0.033 
 (0.035) (0.031) (0.038) (0.067) 
Employee owns (omitted: No shares)     
<1% 0.337*** 0.371*** 0.226** 0.273 
 (0.106) (0.100) (0.110) (0.174) 
≥1% 0.221 0.221* 0.105 0.108 
 (0.152) (0.132) (0.264) (0.291) 
F-test for occupation effects 2.05* 2.27** 0.77 0.34 
F-test for industry effects 9.60*** 11.74*** 1.23 0.86 
F-test for year effects 2.62** 5.81*** 2.62** 3.09** 
F-test for district effects … 1992.01*** … … 
R2 (R2-within for FE estimates) 0.256 0.280 0.126 0.151 
Panel B 
Ωjt (local arrears)  0.634*** 0.227* 0.609*** 0.818*** 
 (0.051) (0.122) (0.108) (0.130) 
R2 (R2-within for FE estimates) 0.262 0.155 0.136 0.153 
 
Notes:  Observations=12850 employee-respondents in the nonpublic sector.  Robust standard errors in parentheses are 
adjusted for clustering within local areas; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The 
constant term, 9 occupation dummies, 9 industry dummies, 5 year dummies, and 3 dummies for missing values of log 
of wages, log of family income, and employee ownership are included but not shown in Panel A.  The specification in 
Panel B includes the same set of covariates as in Panel A as well as the full interaction between the federal region 
dummies and year dummies.   
 
 35
Table 4:  Linear Reaction Function with Instrumental Variables, Nonpublic Sector 
 
 District FE Firm FE 
 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Second stage results for local arrears 
Ωjt (local arrears)  0.702*** 0.607*** 0.862*** 0.778* 0.730* 0.881*** 0.696*** 0.957** 0.852* 0.773* 
 (0.134) (0.153) (0.297) (0.410) (0.400) (0.194) (0.194) (0.379) (0.456) (0.445) 
npjt (local share of public  … … 1.858 2.003 2.078* … … 3.444** 3.613** 3.710** 
   sector employees)   (1.142) (1.306) (1.249)   (1.516) (1.617) (1.609) 
Hansen J statistic 4.182 4.041 1.179 … 0.028 4.125 1.723 1.504 … 0.064 
Hansen p-value 0.041 0.044 0.278 … 0.866 0.042 0.189 0.220 … 0.800 
R2-within second stage 0.146 0.134 0.134 0.137 0.138 0.125 0.123 0.126 0.128 0.128 
 12850 8931 12850 12850 12850 12850 8931 12850 12850 12850 
First stage results 
npjt  1.253** 2.25* 2.786*** 2.847*** 2.965*** 1.120* 2.436** 2.515** 2.586** 2.729** 
    (0.531) (1.192) (0.984) (1.066) (1.028) (0.590 (1.186) (1.027) (1.099) (1.057) 
Ωpjt 0.661*** 0.063*** … … … 0.666*** 0.063*** … … … 
 (0.075) (0.019)    (0.081) (0.019)    
Ωpt … … 0.564** … … … … 0.552** … … 
   (0.221)     (0.222)   
Ωpt ⋅ npjt … … -0.971* -1.064* -4.427* … … -0.942* -1.055* -4.453* 
   (0.532) (0.635) (2.525)   (0.547) (0.643) (2.583) 
Ωpt ⋅ npjt2 … … … … 4.529 … … … … 4.636 
     (3.209)     (3.250) 
F-test of excluded IVs 42.561*** 6.688*** 3.331** 2.811* 2.536* 35.019*** 6.746*** 3.195** 2.69* 2.3* 
R2 first stage 0.742 0.702 0.622 0.615 0.618 0.748 0.713 0.630 0.624 0.627 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering within local areas; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All 
specifications in Table 4 include the same set of covariates as in Table 3.  npjt is the local share of public sector employees in (1) and (3)-(5) and the local share of 
defense sector employees in (2); Ωpjt is average wage arrears of the public sector employees in the local district in (1) and average wage arrears of defense workers in 
the local district in (2); Ωpt is federal region wage arrears in the public sector outside of a given local area in (3), and national public sector wage arrears in (4)-(5).  
The public sector consists of municipal utilities, public services such as health care, education, and government, and defense industries.  The defense sector includes 
employees in defense manufacturing and army.  
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Table 5:  Costs of Wage Arrears, Results from Worker Data 
 
 Desire to 
 Switch Jobs  
(Probit, dF/dX) 
Hours of Work 
(Tobit) 
Quit in  
Two Years 
(Probit, dF/dX) 
ωit (monthly wages overdue) 0.022*** -1.870*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.260) (0.003) 
Ωjt (local arrears) -0.003 -1.249 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.889) (0.009) 
ωit*Ωjt -0.002*** 0.210*** -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.052) (0.001) 
Male -0.017* 31.135*** 0.066*** 
 (0.009) (1.223) (0.012) 
Schooling (years) 0.012*** 0.896*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.268) (0.003) 
Age (years) -0.008*** 0.290*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.050) (0.000) 
Tenure (years) -0.007*** -0.199*** -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.065) (0.001) 
Log of hourly wage rate -0.072*** -17.947*** -0.027*** 
 (0.005) (0.677) (0.007) 
Log of family income  -0.007* -0.812 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.600) (0.006) 
Employee owns (omitted: No shares)    
<1% 0.007 -0.073 -0.042*** 
 (0.013) (1.759) (0.016) 
≥1% -0.088*** 18.958*** 0.001 
 (0.019) (2.744) (0.026) 
Observations 19548 19248 9441 
LR chi2 / Wald chi2 2280.771 7449.844 790.915 
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.036 0.076 
 
Notes:  Sample consists of all employee-respondents in the RLMS.  Robust standard errors in parentheses; * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The constant term, 9 occupation dummies, 9 
industry dummies, 52 district dummies, 5 year dummies, and 3 dummies for missing values of log of wages, log of 
family income, and employee ownership are included but not shown here. 
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Table 6:  Costs of Wage Arrears, Results from Firm Data 
 
 Quit Rate 
(OLS) 
Strikes 
(Probit, dF/dX) 
Legal Penalties
(Probit, dF/dX)
ωit (number of monthly wages  0.010*** 0.003*** 0.0006** 
  overdue) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0003) 
Ωjt (local arrears) -0.001 0.002** 0.0004 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.0003) 
ωit*Ωjt /100 -0.168** -0.060*** -0.0134** 
 (0.076) (0.020) (0.0067) 
Union density (100% is omitted)    
0-9% 0.047** -0.001 … 
 (0.023) (0.003)  
10-59% 0.024** 0.002 … 
 (0.012) (0.004)  
60-79% -0.009 0.009 … 
 (0.011) (0.006)  
80-89% -0.000 0.004 … 
 (0.011) (0.004)  
90-100% 0.002 0.000 … 
 (0.006) (0.003)  
Fringe benefits provided by firms (dummies) 
Training -0.020** 0.004** … 
 (0.008) (0.002)  
Kindergartens -0.011 -0.001 … 
 (0.007) (0.002)  
Housing purchase and  -0.009 0.003 … 
  construction (0.006) (0.002)  
Training costs (days) /100 -0.009*** 0.002*** … 
 (0.003) (0.001)  
Type of location (Moscow and St. Petersburg are omitted) 
Regional Capital City 0.014 0.009 0.0001 
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.0008) 
Other city 0.026** 0.004 -0.0021** 
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.0010) 
Non-city -0.028* -0.004 -0.0016* 
 (0.016) (0.004) (0.0008) 
Legal Environment    
Fraction of cases when managers  … … -0.0091** 
  failed to pay assessed fines on time   (0.0042) 
Fraction of cases when arrears were … … -0.0057** 
  paid off after violation was discovered   (0.0026) 
Observations 2611 4061 3984 
R2 0.137 0.241 0.303 
 
Notes:  Sample consists of industrial and agricultural firms.  Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Intercept and dummies for years, industries, and non-reported 
training costs are included but not shown here. 
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Table 7:  Non-Linear Reaction Function of Wage Arrears, Nonpublic Sector 
 
 OLS District FE Firm FE Firm- Worker FE 
Panel A 
Ω jt (local arrears)  -0.097 -0.641** 0.052 0.084 
 (0.230) (0.288) (0.269) (0.306) 
Ω jt 2 0.234*** 0.249*** 0.181*** 0.175** 
 (0.062) (0.058) (0.056) (0.080) 
Ω jt 3 -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.011** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
R2 (R2-within) 0.262 0.155 0.129 0.155 
Panel B 
Ω jt (local arrears)  -0.265 -1.023*** -0.303 0.078 
 (0.215) (0.326) (0.283) (0.229) 
Ω jt 2 0.251*** 0.287*** 0.215*** 0.176*** 
 (0.056) (0.059) (0.050) (0.060) 
Ω jt 3 -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
R2 (R2-within) 0.268 0.161 0.140 0.156 
 
Notes:  Observations=12850 employee-respondents in the nonpublic sector.  Robust standard errors in parentheses are 
adjusted for clustering within local areas; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The 
equations in this table also include all other variables in Table 4, but the results for these variables are very similar and 
therefore not shown here.  The specification in Panel B also has a full set of interactions between federal district 
dummies and year dummies. 
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Figure 1:  Nonlinear Reaction Function of Wage Arrears 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Symmetric Nash Equilibria 
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Figure 3:  Estimated Nonlinear Reaction Function 
 
  
